The individual weaknesses that I will point out are these. OD, and all other forms of Dualism, are inconsistent with relativity; FP has the wrong concept of mind, and it is wrong to assume that all mental processes are algorithmic; Neither OM nor any other mentalist theory is the best explanation for the results of the spin-measurement experiments; RN is wrong because it implies empiricism; and CE is wrong to assume that the existence of the physical could possibly depend upon mind.
My attack on CE will be the beginning of my attack on Idealism. I will subsequently show how the other theories (yes, even FP) are based at least partly on the Idealist concept of the mind. I will then show that ES is not based on the Idealist concept at all, but on a Materialist concept of the mind. I will defend Materialism as the truth and show that it implies ES. That will end my argument for ES. In the next chapter, I will finish with a discussion of the implications that ES has for other areas of philosophy.
ES resembles Dualism insofar as it claims the existence of both the mental and the physical, but it escapes this objection by claiming that everything that has a mental identity also has a physical identity. Thus, it claims that minds exist in both space and time, and is therefore consistent with relativity.
I believe that the assumption we must give up is that we are dealing with two different particles in these experiments. If we give up this assumption, which means we now assume we are dealing with one particle, then the results of the spin-measurement experiments immediately follow. This is a good reason for giving up this assumption, for the results do not immediately follow if we give up any of the other assumptions. All that giving up any other assumption does is allow for the possibility that we could get the results we get. If we gave up contrafactualness, for example, it would be as much a coincidence that we get the results we do as it would be if we got the results Einstein's theory predicts. If we gave up belief in a physical world, we would have no more reason to expect the results we get than to expect the results Einstein's theory predicts. The same goes for the other assumptions it has been suggested we give up. But if we assume we are dealing with one particle, then any change to "one" must immediately imply a change in the "other."
Furthermore, we give up less by giving up the belief that we are dealing with two particles than we would if we gave up other assumptions. Although the classical view does not allow for a particle to be in two places at once, there is nothing in the concept of physical that requires something to be in only one place. First of all, a physical object, even a particle, is a unit. On the classical level, one part of a unit may be one place, and another part someplace else. If we sit an apple on a table, for example, different parts of the apple are on different places on the table. Let's now pass that apple through Flatland, which is a two-dimensional world populated by two-dimensional beings. As it begins to pass through Flatland, an observer, say Mr. Square, sees four curved lines. (Flatlanders cannot see whole two-dimensional shapes at once. They can see shapes only from the side.) After a moment, the four curved lines are replaced by a larger curved line. The curved line changes shape and size until it is replaced by a much smaller curved line (the stem), and then that too disappears. All this time, Mr. Square is completely bewildered. What he has seen goes against all the known laws of classical Flatland physics.
Let's now bring the analogy to our level. Mr. Square was bewildered because he assumed that everything must be two-dimensional. The results of the spin-measurement experiments bewilder us because we assume that the world is three-dimensional. If we assume that the world has more than three dimensions, though, we can imagine that a particle is multi-dimensional, and that it appears to be in two places only because we have a limited view of it. If Mr. Square were lifted out of Flatland and given a three-dimensional perspective, he would see that the four lines are part of the same object. If we were given a greater perspective than our three-dimensional one, along with microscopic vision, we might see that what we think are two particles are actually one particle.
Furthermore, throwing aside our belief in three-dimensionality does not require us to abandon our belief in the physical. There is no requirement that anything physical must be three-dimensional. In fact, physicists have already abandoned belief in three-dimensionality. They simply have not all realized that it is all that needs to be abandoned to explain the results of the spin- measurement experiments. (Perhaps from lack of reading Flatland and comic book stories about Mr. Mxyzptlk, the fifth dimensional imp who bugs Superman with his extra-dimensional powers, and Bat-Mite, the fourth dimensional imp who is a fan of Batman.) Since no other assumptions needs to be abandoned, physics gives us no reason to abandon them. Thus, physics offers no evidence for mentalism of any sort.
Although both ED and EP are false, the former highlights an aspect of mind that FP neglects, and the latter points out that the cause of behavior is not always mental. For ED, mind is nothing but consciousness of what it is like to be something. For FP, this is the problem of qualia. For those mental events that we are conscious of (and I will leave it open right now whether there are kinds we're not conscious of), there is something that it is like to have them. FP's response to this is that these qualia are incidental to the mental events. As an example, blind-sight is sometimes offered. This is essentially sight without qualia. Apparently, some people who are not regularly sighted can behave as if they are. Nevertheless, this is not an exhaustive response to the Epiphenomenalist objection. This response uses a mental event that is normally defined by its functional role. There are, however, mental events that are not defined by their functional role. Happiness is one of these. Although happy people usually display quite different behavior than unhappy people do, happiness is not defined by its functional role in causing happy behavior; rather, it is defined as the evaluation that one's life or situation is good. Happiness will by its nature bring about certain behavior, but this functional role in determining behavior is incidental to what happiness is.
In arguing for the false claim that no behavior is caused by mental events, EP at least points out that some behavior cannot be explained by mental events. The PBS series The Mind, for example, told about a man who breathed some paint fumes and as a result went wild and killed a woman. His behavior was a result of how the paint fumes affected his brain, not a result of mental events. To further illustrate this point, the show also told about a man who gave his cat a flea powder made from the same chemicals that were in the paint. As a result, the cat started killing other animals quite regularly, whereas it had been docile before.
Since FP falls prey to both the Epiphenomenalist and Eliminative Materialist objections, it is likely that it is false. But there is an even more important objection to FP, an epistemological objection. Instead of recognizing that a mental event has identity and defining it in terms of its identity, it defines a mental event in terms of its relationship to behavior. This is wrong for the following reason. If something has a relationship to something else, then it is something. If it is something, then it ought to be defined according to what it is, not according to its relationship to something else.
For instance, it is improper to define "human" as "the dominant life form on earth." Although it is quite true that humans are the dominant life form on earth, it is not the relationship of dominance that makes something human. Similarly, it is not the relationship that an inner event has to behavior that makes it a mental event. The only proper way to define any mental event is to define it by that characteristic which makes it a mental event. Since behavior is only an effect of mental events, its relationship to mental events cannot be regarded as the fundamental characteristic of mental events. FP makes the mistake of defining mental events in terms of an incidental characteristic instead of in terms the fundamental characteristic of mental events.
As a result of this epistemological mistake, FP fails to distinguish between different mental events that produce the same observable behavior. A good liar, for example, can lie without his observable behavior being any different than if he had told the truth. The only difference between lying and telling the truth for him is mental--but mental in a sense that FP doesn't recognize. Since FP has so much trouble in identifying mental events and in distinguishing between them, I have to conclude that it is not an adequate solution to the mind/body problem.
I will now show that ES does not meet with the objections that FP has met with. For ES, a mental event is defined according to its identity, not according to its relation to something else, such as behavior. As a result of this, something can be a mental event even if it plays no functional role in determining behavior. Although it might be that every or almost every mental event has a functional role in determining behavior, ES recognizes that this is not the defining characteristic of a mental event. Since it does not define a mental event by its functional role, it also leaves open the possibility that some behavior is not the result of mental events. Thus, ES faces neither the Epiphenomenalist objection nor the Eliminative Materialist objection. Therefore, it fares better than FP.
He begins by introducing a system in which the commands for an algorithmic language are each represented by a number. Each of these numbers can be translated into binary form, such that each command is represented by a string of zeros and ones. After establishing some system whereby one command can be distinguished from the next, a program can be represented by a string of commands. Since each command is represented by a series of zeros and ones, the program is represented by a larger series of zeros and ones. Thus, each possible program corresponds to a different binary number, which can of course be translated into a decimal number. Each program can be represented as Tn(m), where n represents the number of the program, and m represents the value to be put into it.
Penrose then considers a specific type of program, one which will determine from a program's number whether that program will ever stop for a given value. This program will return a zero if the program never stops, and a one if it does stop. He represents this program as H(n; m), where n stands for the number of the program to be evaluated, and m stands for the value to be put into program n. He then considers a program, Tk(n), that gives the value for 1 + Tn(n) × H(n; n). The value that Tk returns is one plus the value Tn returns for itself if it does stop, and one if it does not stop. He now considers what this program would do if it acted on itself. Thus, we would have Tk(k) = 1 + Tk(k) × H(k; k). Penrose points out that Tk(k) cannot stop, for there would be a contradiction if it did. Since H(k; k) would return a value of one if Tk(k) stopped, Tk(k) would be equal to one plus itself if it stopped, and that is a contradiction. Since Tk(k) doesn't stop, we know that the value for 1 + Tk(k) × H(k; k) is 1 + Tk(k) * 0, which is 1 + 0, which is 1. Yet Tk(k) can never figure out that the answer is 1. Thus, we have just solved a mathematical problem that could not be solved algorithmically. Therefore, mental events are not all algorithmic.
Although much of what the mind does may be algorithmic, what the mind can do is ultimately based on knowledge that cannot be obtained algorithmically. For example, all our cognition is guided by the laws of thought (identity, excluded middle, and noncontradiction), yet none of these laws can be proven algorithmically. Nevertheless, the normal human mind recognizes these laws as indisputable facts. Penrose points out that the same is true for mathematical knowledge. Gödel demonstrated that no formal system of worthwhile power could be both complete and consistent. If it were consistent, its axioms could not be proven in the system. Penrose explains that this is not a problem at all, that it is not any kind of threat to the truth of mathematics. He explains that the axioms of mathematics are obvious and have no need to be proven. In coming up with mathematics, we begin with obvious, but non-algorithmically provable, axioms. We then build our rules upon the axioms, just as in logic we build our rules upon the laws of thought.
Since FP regards the "mind" as a formal system, it ultimately regards us as incapable of knowing mathematical axioms and the laws of thought. Since we do know them, FP fails. In all fairness, however, it should be noted that of all the false theories, FP comes closest to the truth. The mind does perform certain functions, it does process information, it does affect behavior. The problem with FP is the problem with Russell's and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. It does not recognize the limits of a formal system.
As I demonstrated in my discussion on Platonism, empiricism is false. According to empiricism, the mind plays no active role in acquiring knowledge. If there is a mind at all, it is just a receptacle for sensations. Bertrand Russell believes that the idea of a receptacle for sensations is superfluous. Since he holds that there is no other sense in which something could be a mind, he claims that minds do not exist.
Russell is wrong, though, to believe that a mind could be nothing more than a receptacle for sensations. There is more to a mind than the sensations it has. Indeed, the mind plays an active role in acquiring knowledge. Sensation is not all there is to knowledge; it is only the first step. After the mind receives sensations, it uses reason to integrate, understand, and make sense of its sensations. I know there is a red phone in front of me because my mind interprets the sensations I receive as a red phone. RN is false because it denies that there is a mind that plays an active role in acquiring knowledge.
If mind is more fundamental than matter, then there must be at least one mind that is neither physical nor dependent on anything physical. For if every mind were physical or dependent on the physical, we would have to say that matter is more fundamental than mind. If a mind exists completely non- physically, then its existence must be subjective. This means that the mind's identity depends upon what some mind believes it is. By the law of excluded middle, the mind that its identity depends on must be either itself or another mind. If it is another mind, then that mind must be either physical or non- physical. If it is physical, then matter is more fundamental then mind. Since that contradicts our original assumption, it must be non-physical. It can't be true that each mind owes its existence to another mind, for something must exist before it can make something else exist. Therefore, Idealism requires that there be at least one non-physical mind that is responsible for its own existence and whose identity depends upon its own beliefs about itself. It is whatever it believes it is.
Consider now the strange theory of truth that arises from the existence of such a being. Instead of being correspondence to reality, truth is merely whatever the being believes about itself, and reality is merely correspondence with truth. Instead of having knowledge grounded in truth and truth grounded in reality, this theory has reality grounded in truth and truth grounded in knowledge. This is a complete reversal of the correspondence theory of truth.
Suppose, now, that the being chooses to believe that he is a physical being. Since believing something is what makes it true, such a being can truthfully believe that he is physical. Yet it is because he is not physical that the reverse-correspondence theory of truth is true for him. Thus, such a being who believes himself to be physical is both physical and non-physical. Since that is a contradiction, there can be no such thing as a non-physical mind whose identity depends upon its own beliefs about itself.
Since such a mind had to exist in order for there to be any non- physical minds in an idealist universe, the universe is either an idealist one without non-physical minds, or Idealism is false. Since an idealist universe without non-physical minds is a contradiction, Idealism must be false. This means that mind is dependent on matter, and that CE is false.
Even though Neutral Monism denies the existence of minds, it is also an idealist theory. This is because it claims that the only things that exist are the contents of sensation. It takes the contents of mind as primary, and dismisses everything else--including the mind. Even though it denies the existence of the mind, it is idealist because it regards the contents of consciousness as more fundamental than the objects of consciousness.
Although PS and VS claim that all minds are physical, they too are partly idealistic, for they hold that the mind has supernatural powers over the body. This is a residue of the idealistic belief that a mind can be whatever it thinks it is. PS and VS claim that we have free will because they regard consciousness to be an aspect of matter that is above natural law.
Although Physicalism and ED are more materialist than idealist, they too are at fault, for they are based partly on idealist premises. According to P, there are no minds, and according to ED, minds are impotent. Rather than either of these being an out-and-out rejection of Idealism, though, each is a surrender to the idealist concept of the mind.
In its full-blown version, the idealist mind is whatever it thinks it is. It has supernatural powers, and it is non-physical. ED agrees with idealism that the mind is non-physical. When Physicalism denies the existence of minds, it does so because it holds that non-physical things with supernatural powers do not exist. What it fails to realize is that minds do not have to be non-physical and supernatural.
If the mind did not have the ability to learn, it would not be able to imagine anything. Imagination does not consist in creating ideas out of the blue. It consists in applying one's knowledge in novel ways. Take, for instance, the science fiction writer. He might dream of creatures that are quite unlike anything on earth, or of inventions that no one yet knows how to make. Nevertheless, the products of his imagination will be based on what he knows. For example, a time machine is based on the fact that there is time. Our imagination is limited by our knowledge, and we would be unable to imagine anything at all if there were not first a world that we had knowledge of.
The materialist concept of mind recognizes that the mind learns about its world before it imagines how the world could be different. The idealist concept has the mind imagine a world before there can be knowledge. Such a conception is absurd. Although many theories don't hold this conception in pure form, many do contain a residue of it. This residue is contained in the belief that a mind can function independently from its body. According to this view, the body does not make the functioning of the mind possible; rather, the mind has its desires, and it controls the body in order to carry them out.
According to the materialist concept of mind, it is impossible to have a mind without a body. If the fundamental characteristic of the mind is the ability to have beliefs about the world it is in, then it must have the means to be able to learn about its world. To learn about the world, it must have some means to interact with the world. Since the world is physical, the means that the mind employs must also be physical. Specifically, the mind needs sense organs that register changes in the outside world. Sense organs, of course, must be physical. It should be obvious that a physical mechanism is needed to register changes of light, and that a non-physical device would not do.
In order to integrate and make sense of its sensations, the mind needs to be able to employ reason. It must also be able to form concepts. Although I admit to no knowledge of the physics or neurophysiology of concept-formation, I have no reason to think that a non-physical entity could form concepts better than a physical one can. Since a concept is the mind's understanding of an essence, and since an essence has an objective, epistemological identity, I would well think that a mind that also has an objective identity (i.e. a physical mind) would understand an essence much more easily than a mind that has a subjective identity (i.e. a non-physical mind).
Furthermore, it is truly our experience that our minds are physical, not non-physical. It is true that we are not aware of some mechanical process inside of us when we are thinking. Nevertheless, this does not amount to experiencing our minds as non-physical. We experience our minds as physical because we experience them as limited by our bodies. For example, it is harder to think when you are tired, and it is easier to think well if you have exercised and eaten a good breakfast.
Moreover, science indicates that the functioning of the mind is dependent on the functioning of the body. Hallucinogens cause hallucinations. Sexual attraction is stimulated by hormones. Vitamin deficiencies can cause various mental disorders, such as short-term memory loss, depression, hyperactivity, etc. (Yepsen, p. 27) Lack of sunlight can cause depression. (Yepsen, p. 62) And in many other ways, science has shown that the mind is dependent on the state of the body.
In this respect, Emergentism is similar to FP. Neither means the same thing by mind as it does by brain. Just as FP allows for the existence of "minds" in Martians who "think" with hydraulic pumps in their feet, so ES allows for the existence of minds in any beings who are capable of beliefs.
The difference between FP and ES is that ES does not consider the mind to be a formal system that can be considered separately from the body. The mind is identified by the role it plays, but it is part of the body, and it cannot be transferred to another body--except perhaps surgically.
For ES, mind is not something that exists in all matter. Rather, the mind is a part of the body that is as specific in its function as the digestive system is in its. Just as the digestive system digests food, so the mind digests information. There is no more mind in every bit of matter than there is digestive system in every bit of matter.
The mind is emergent, which means that it has properties that are different than the properties of what it is made of. This does not imply that its properties could not be predicted from an understanding of the properties of its parts. Whether it can or cannot is an epistemological issue, not a metaphysical one. I agree with emergentist Harry Binswanger that the description of something as emergent is a metaphysical claim, not an epistemological claim.
In this sense of the word, which is different than it has often been used, many things are emergent. For example, a radio is emergent because it is not made out of things that individually have the ability to convert radio waves into sound. It is only the radio that has radio properties. Similarly, it is only the mind that has mental properties. Mental properties are physical properties, but they are not the kind of properties that belong to anything besides minds. In a similar vein, radio properties belong to nothing except radios, and there is nothing strange about that.
ES is the one and only correct solution to the mind/body problem, for it is the only theory that is fully consistent with Materialism. It is also the only theory that accords with experience. Besides that, it does not have any of the problems that the other theories have. Since it considers the mind to be part of the body, it does not suffer the explanatory difficulties of Dualism. Since it holds that all minds are physical, it does not fall into contradiction like Mentalism, Emanationism, and some forms of Dualism do. Since it holds that minds are agents, it does not fall into the contradiction that ED does. Since it does not hold any idealist premises about what a mind is, it does not make the physicalist mistake of assuming that minds do not exist, nor does it make the panpsychist and vitalist mistake of assuming that mind is supernatural. Since it assumes that the mind plays an active role in acquiring knowledge, it does not imply the false theory of empiricism as Neutral Monism does. From all of this evidence, there is no other conclusion than that Emergentism is the one and only correct solution to the mind/body problem.