The issue here is not whether sin exists. It has nothing to do with Adam and Eve eating forbidden fruit. It is whether people have an inherent bad streak that cannot be removed or whether moral perfection is attainable. I intend to argue that each of us does have an ineliminable dark side, a bad streak that's with us to stay. Part of the importance of this thesis is in the light it sheds on those who deny it. If it's true, those who deny it also deny a part of themselves. This denial may have dire consequences for their lives, their behavior, and their character. Furthermore, a person who denies the existence of his dark side is the sort of person M. Scott Peck describes as evil in People of the Lie. The lie here is the belief that they are morally perfect.
I suspect that Ayn Rand found such an idea morally repugnant, and that her repugnance fueled her rejection of original sin. On the face of it, it does seem morally repugnant to rule that everyone is evil from the start. However, I don't think the idea is as repugnant as Ayn Rand felt it was. I believe her repugnance was in part fueled by the belief that someone who is evil cannot also be good. Thus, I believe that her understanding of original sin is not just that people are all bad but that no one is at all good. Taken in this way, I would have to reject the doctrine of original sin myself. But that is not how I understand it. I do not take it to mean that not one of us is good. Rather, I take it to mean that we all have a tendency to be bad, to err, to trip up over ourselves, no matter how hard we try.
However, Ayn Rand still has more objections to the idea of original sin, even to the version I think is less repugnant and more accurate. The other point she made in the sentence I quoted is that the doctrine of original sin requires us to live up to a standard of the good that it is impossible for us to fully live up to. This is true in a sense. The doctrine of original sin does say that we can never succeed at being 100% good all the time. We will always have our dark side to deal with. But given the truth of Rand's objection, we still have to evaluate its weight.
I believe the weight of Rand's objection is carried by an unstated premise. That premise goes something like this: The true moral code cannot be such that it is impossible to fulfill it in every detail. This in fact is just a corollary of her claim that moral perfection is possible. It also seems to be an application of ought implies can, which gives it some plausibility.
But if ought implies can is to support Rand's objection, it needs to be supplemented by what Bernard Williams has called the agglomeration principle. This principle says that if I ought to do each of two different actions, I ought to do both. By applying this principle over and over again, I finally reach the conclusion that I ought to perform the sum total of the deeds that I each individually ought to. Given the assumption that there is a correct moral code about what I ought to do, it follows that I ought to meet every demand of this moral code t the letter. If I ought to do this and if ought implies can, then I am capable of meeting the true moral code in its entirety. And that means that moral perfection is possible. The argument I just described looks like this:
1. (x) (O(x) -> <>(x)) - Ought implies can
2. (x)(y) [(O(x) & O(y)) -> O(x&y)] - Agglomeration principle
3. O(a), O(b), ... O(n) - An enumeration of everything I ought to
do
4. O(a, b, ... n) - I ought to do it all
5. <>(a, b, ... n) - I can do it all
This is a valid argument against Original Sin. If it has any faults, it is
with one of the first three premises. Since I have trouble not only with
accepting the final conclusion at 5 but also the intermediate conclusion at
4, I will begin with the premises that lead to 4: 2 & 3. For the moment at least, I will take premise 3 as given. It is just the enumeration of everything I ought to do, whatever that may be. The more controversial premise is the agglomeration principle. When we think of moral dilemmas, it might seem obvious that the agglomeration principle is false. A moral dilemma is when you are faced with two conflicting ought. You can fulfill either one, but they are such that you cannot fulfill both. For example, you may have to choose which of two people to save, and the circumstances prevent you from saving both. In such an instance, it seems wrong to conclude that you ought to do both. However, it seems wrong only if we hold onto ought implies can and we accept that there are genuine moral dilemmas.
If we reject either of these, we haven't refuted the agglomeration principle. However, either the agglomeration principle or ought implies can must go if we can establish that there are moral dilemmas. Therefore, the existence of genuine moral dilemmas would be enough to refute this argument against Original Sin.
If we want to find out whether moral dilemmas could exist, it may be more efficient to try to manufacture them than it would be to look for naturally occurring moral dilemmas. I don't mean to just make up examples rather than drawing from life. Rather, I mean to imagine a perverse person, called Gobkin, who deliberately tries to create moral dilemmas for himself. If Gobkin can succeed at this, that will suffice to show that there can be moral dilemmas. That in turn will refute the conjunction of ought implies can and the agglomeration principle.
Suppose, for instance, that Gobkin vows before God and a host of witnesses that he will brutally murder Mother Theresa. He already has the obligation not to murder her, and by promising to murder her, it would seem that he has put upon himself the obligation to murder her. This examples works so long as a promise to do what is immoral is a binding promise. We could accept the principle that a promise to do what is immoral is never binding. If we accept this principle, we may also accept the principle that such promises are morally wrong, sort of like lies are wrong. These principles are plausible enough that this example doesn't establish the possibility of moral dilemmas.
However, the first principle becomes less plausible if the second is false, and there are some difficulties with the second. The principle that it is wrong to promise to do what you know is wrong is plausible. But what about when you promise to do what is wrong, de re, but you don't know that it is wrong? For example, let's suppose that a computer programmer promises to his boss that he will decompile a competitor's program to find out how it works. This may be software piracy, which is wrong. Supposing it is, but the computer programmer doesn't realize this, is it wrong for him to make the promise? I wouldn't think so. People regularly promise to do jobs for their bosses, and that isn't wrong. If the principle that it is always wrong to promise to do what is wrong is false, then we might not be so quick to say that promises to never do what is wrong are never binding. For example, let's suppose that the programmer broke his promise because the competitor bribed him to mess things up. Wouldn't we hold him culpable for breaking his word? If we would, then it seems like we have a moral dilemma here. The programmer has the obligation to keep his promise and the obligation to avoid piracy, and these are incompatible.
What would an opponent of moral dilemmas say about this example? He might try to deny one of the obligations. He may stick to the principle that promises to do what is wrong are never binding. This way is problematic, as I have been suggesting. Although the programmer avoids software piracy, which is wrong, he is not morally blameless. Taking the bribe was wrong, and we may say that the way he avoided software piracy, by sabotaging his work behind his boss's back, was wrong. The most morally upright thing he could have done is to tell his boss that he should not ask him to engage in this project, because it is immoral. He may be excused for not doing this, because he didn't know any better. But this ignorance does not excuse him from taking a bribe and sabotaging his work. It is wrong to take bribes, and in most instances it is wrong to sabotage your work.
However, taking bribes and sabotaging his work are not integral to the example. There are other ways he could inadvertently avoid software piracy. Suppose a hacker from the competitor secretly corrupts all his copies of the program so as to make it impossible to keep his word. As a result, he ends up not committing piracy.
However, he is still guilty of the attempt. If software piracy is wrong, then so presumably is the attempt to do it. I presume the following principle: If an act is wrong to do, it is wrong to attempt. If someone promises to do what is wrong, he is guilty of one of two wrong actions: either he lies or he attempts to do what is wrong. In effect, he puts himself in a position where he has to make a liar of himself or he has to attempt what is wrong, which is itself wrong.
Although we might be inclined to say that it is not wrong to break your word when you have promised to do what is wrong, I don't think we want to say that it is alright to make a false promise to do what is wrong. To do so is to tell a lie. If it's not, then false promises are in general not lies. So the dilemma, if it exists, is not between breaking his word and committing piracy; it is between making a liar of himself and attempting to commit piracy.
To get out of this dilemma, we will have to deny that it is always wrong to attempt what is wrong when you don't know any better, or we will have to deny that it is always wrong to lie.
There may be situations where it is ok to lie. If a lie will save an innocent person from a known serial killer, for instance, it seems ok. In this situation we would hold the liar blameless. Suppose however that the serial killer comes across a habitual liar who doesn't recognize him as a serial killer. If the habitual liar gives him the same lie, I think we would want to hold him culpable for his lie--even if it does save a life. Even if the habitual liar recognizes the serial killer after he has spoken, it doesn't make him less culpable.
I propose that the programmer is in a situation more like that of the habitual liar. Let me contrast this with a situation more like the former. Suppose a criminal threatens to kill your son unless you promise to assassinate some political figure. And suppose you also know that the cops will arrive soon and put this guy away for good. But in the meantime he will kill your son unless you make the promise. If making the promise will save your son, then it may not be wrong to make it. It also wouldn't be wrong to break the promise. This is analogous to lying to the serial killer to save a life.
So I want to say that the programmer has put himself into a moral dilemma. Gobkin could then put himself into moral dilemmas by indiscriminately making promises.
If there are moral dilemmas, then either ought implies can is false or the agglomeration principle is false. If either one is false, the Rand inspired argument for moral perfection fails. However, it is still difficult to show that moral dilemmas exist.
So far, however, the argument only shows that a person can do everything that is morally required of him. Ayn Rand assumes that this is the same as moral perfection. But as Earl Conee points out, this assumption should be questioned. Conee believes it is false. He believes moral perfection consists not only in being perfectly scrupulous, but in being superlative to the highest degree in all moral matters. This means doing what is supererogatory as well as what is required. Conee puts forth an argument against the possibility of moral perfection as he understands it, but that argument includes some false premises and fails. However, Conee's understanding of moral perfection is enough to show that that the Randian argument fails.
1. That which is outside the possibility of choice is outside the
province of morality.
2. If man is evil by birth, he has no will.
3. If he has no will, he can be neither good nor evil. (1)
4. If man is evil by birth, he can be neither good nor evil. (2,
3)
5. Man is not evil by birth. (4)
This argument works by showing that a contradiction follows from the claim
that man is born evil. The idea behind this argument is that only people
with free will can be evil, and anyone who is born evil lacks free will. It
can be put more clearly like so:
1. A person is not evil unless he chooses of his own free will to
do evil.
2. A person who is born evil lacks free will.
3. If there is Original Sin, then people are born evil.
4. A person who is born evil cannot choose of his own free will to
do evil. (2)
5. A person who is born evil is not evil. (1, 4)
6. No one is born evil. (5)
7. There is no Original Sin. (3, 6)
This argument is valid. Any fault lies in one of the first three premises.
Let's start with the third premise. It says that people are born evil if
there is Original Sin. This is true in the sense that people are born with
a tendency to be bad if there is Original Sin. But is is false in the sense
I think Rand intends. If she takes Original Sin to mean that that people
are born thoroughly corrupt with no trace of goodness, her characterization
of it is wrong. Given Rand's understanding of Original Sin, this argument
fails. But there is also the sense in which the third premise is true. Let's go on to evaluate the argument with that sense in mind. Given this understanding of what it means to be born evil, I think the second premise is false.
I believe we are born not only with evil tendencies but with good tendencies. In other words, we are born with opposing tendencies. This is compatible with free will. If we have free will, it can play the role of choosing between these tendencies. So a person who is born with a tendency toward evil does not have to lack free will.
The first premise can be understood to say that a person can have no tendency to be bad unless he can freely choose to be bad. This is how it has to be understood to keep from equivocating. But when it is understood this way, it is clearly false.
Understood as Rand probably intends it, it is less obviously false, but the third premise is then false, and the argument still fails. So the argument fails however we understand what it means to be born evil.
That's the last of Rand's objections to a philosophical understanding of Original Sin. The rest of the passage focuses on the Christian myth of Adam and Eve.
As I want to make it clear, bad does not mean the same thing as evil. As I understand these ideas, being bad is a necessary condition for being evil, but it is not a sufficient condition. It is in another part of my dissertation that I fully delineate what bad means. So I won't do that here. Suffice to say, being bad is not as bad as being evil.
To understand why the thesis of Original Sin is true, let's look at what it takes to be morally perfect. One thesis that Conee raises is the claim that moral perfection consists in always doing what is right. Conee disagrees with this thesis, and so do I. One flaw with this thesis is that it leaves plenty of room for a person to be bad. For example, a person could resent morality and still follow the correct moral code to the letter. A better understanding of moral perfection is that it consists in being supremely good and perfectly scrupulous.
I believe that humans fall short of both of these, and it is part of human nature or part of the human condition that we cannot attain either.
Part of being good is to treat oneself with love. That includes looking out for one's own best interest. As mortals, humans find that their interests regularly conflict with others. Thus, mortals have to cross the interests of others just to be good to themselves. Furthermore, human beings are born with the instinct to survive. Thus human beings are born with a natural imperative to place their own good before the good of others.
This natural imperative in each person is the seed from which man's sin springs. Man's finitude and mortality are the soil in which it grows. The Original Sin of man is not a crime for which he is guilty. Rather, it is this condition that he finds himself in, as a mortal with the instinct to survive. It is a condition that makes it inevitable that he will sin.
Sin, as Henry Fairlie points out, is a distortion of love. Inevitably, sin results when a person is less than fully loving, and this happens all the time. To illustrate this, let's consider each of the Seven Deadly Sins.
People may think of Pride as the sin of loving yourself too much. There is really nothing wrong with loving yourself. That is not what is wrong with Pride. The sin of Pride consists in loving others less than you love yourself. Pride works to erode and destroy the relationships we have with other people. That is the damage it does.
Envy and Anger also erode and destroy our relationships with others. Envy causes us to resent other people, and Anger sows resentment among others. Each results from our mortality and our instinct to survive. Envy results from a preoccupation with one's own concerns. Anger is a response to something that threatens our lives or our livelihood. When we're envious of someone or angry with someone, we are in danger of not loving that person.
Sloth is a sin of insufficient love. When we are slothful, we care about something less than we ought to. Sloth is in all of our sin, as I am trying to illustrate.
Avarice, Gluttony, and Lust are sins of excessive love. But the sin in each is not in loving a lot. It is in neglecting to love. By loving something too much, we neglect other things. The person in love with possessing fails to fully appreciate his possessions. The Glutton fails to appreciate his food, and he fails to appreciate beauty in general. The lustful person fails to appreciate his sexual partner as a person, or he objectifies someone in sexual fantasy.
It is this Objectivist understanding of moral perfection that I want to argue against the possibility of. This is the thesis that there is a true moral code which we can learn and are capable of following to the letter without lapse.
This thesis has two points. The first is that there is a true moral code. The other is that we are capable of following a moral code without lapse. Let's start with the second claim.
If a moral code is simple enough, anyone ought to be able to follow it without lapse. For example, a moral code that says not to kill or steal from your fellow citizens is simple enough to follow. But such a moral code would have nothing to say about many situations. Whatever the true moral code is, I presume it would be more comprehensive.
Following a moral code involves at least two steps. The first is knowing the moral code. The second is to accurately apply the moral code to each situation you find yourself in. Even if we can complete the first step, the second sometimes requires knowledge that is unavailable to us. To apply a moral code to a situation you are in, you sometimes have to know a lot about the situation. Since humans inevitably lack the requisite knowledge on many occasions, living strictly by a moral code isn't always possible for anyone. Sometimes we have to act without assurance that we're doing the right thing. Therefore, the ideal of perfect scrupulousness is possible only for an omniscient being. Humans are not omniscient, and that lack makes them prone to error. Therefore, perfect scrupulousness is beyond human reach.
By egocentricity I mean the tendency to focus on our own interests to the exclusion of others. I'm not referring specifically to the ego as that term is used in analytic psychology. I mention this, because I intend to discuss analytic psychology. According to Jung, there is a shadow archetype in each person.
The shadow is the dark side of the human personality. Among other things, it retains the desires we repress. It reminds us when our own needs aren't being met, and it will act out when we don't listen to it. The shadow often causes us to act poorly toward other people. But the shadow is also essential for our survival. It acts to make sure we are taking care of ourselves. The shadow archetype is the dark side, or at least part of the dark side, that the thesis of Original Sin says we each have.
This is not the same as the commitment to try to do one's best. Given the thesis of Original Sin, it is a commitment to attain the impossible. This brings to mind Caligula as Camus characterized him in a play. Caligula sought the impossible and wrought all kinds of havoc in his attempt to attain it. The difference between Caligula and Ayn Rand is that Caligula acknowledged that he sought the impossible.
The result of Rand's moral ambitiousness was a woman who believed she was more morally perfect than anyone else. She became a moralizing bitch who railed at the faults of others and rationalized away her own. If something wasn't important to her, it wasn't important morally. If someone was in her favor, that person was wonderful. If someone crossed her, he was worse than Judas.
The Pride that so corrupted Rand's soul is the same thing Jesus Christ criticized the Pharisees for. These were people who thought they were better than others because they observed the law. Jesus preferred the company of sinners, i.e. people who knew they were sinners. The Pharisees were sinners too, but they failed to recognize this. Ayn Rand was a modern day Pharisee.
For another example of someone who has no belief in Original Sin, let's look at John Galt, the hero of Rand's novel Atlas Shrugged. John Galt is a selfish man who has no interest in helping others unless there is something in it for him. He invents an engine that converts static electricity into usable electricity. Instead of sharing his invention with the world, he walks away with it and disappears. In the meantime he meets secretly with leaders of industry, convincing them to come away with him and form a new society based on utter selfishness. As he does this, society falls apart and people die. Galt is responsible for all this but feels no guilt. Galt imagines himself as morally perfect. In his hubris he destroys America.
So as not to make Objectivists feel like I am picking on them, let me now turn to Marxism. Objectivism is vehemently opposed to Marxism, but both share in common the belief that moral perfection is possible. The ideal of Marxism is the person who willingly gives all he can to society and is willing to take only what he needs. With this ideal in mind, Marxists have tried to bring about Communism. History shows that this attempt has been a complete failure. It has wrought havoc on the world, cost countless lives, and it has left misery and poverty in its wake.
The failure to understand and appreciate Original Sin has caused destruction and death for ages. This failure was behind the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, the Salem Witch Trials, etc. Self-righteousness has probably caused more death and destruction than any other sin.